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Preface & Acknowledgements 
Welcome to our Tenth Annual Acquisition Research Symposium! We regret that this 
year it will be a “paper only” event. The double whammy of sequestration and a continuing 
resolution, with the attendant restrictions on travel and conferences, created too much 
uncertainty to properly stage the event. We will miss the dialogue with our acquisition 
colleagues and the opportunity for all our researchers to present their work. However, we 
intend to simulate the symposium as best we can, and these Proceedings present an 
opportunity for the papers to be published just as if they had been delivered. In any case, we 
will have a rich store of papers to draw from for next year’s event scheduled for May 14–15, 
2014! 
Despite these temporary setbacks, our Acquisition Research Program (ARP) here at 
the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) continues at a normal pace. Since the ARP’s 
founding in 2003, over 1,200 original research reports have been added to the acquisition 
body of knowledge. We continue to add to that library, located online at 
www.acquisitionresearch.net, at a rate of roughly 140 reports per year. This activity has 
engaged researchers at over 70 universities and other institutions, greatly enhancing the 
diversity of thought brought to bear on the business activities of the DoD.  
We generate this level of activity in three ways. First, we solicit research topics from 
academia and other institutions through an annual Broad Agency Announcement, 
sponsored by the USD(AT&L). Second, we issue an annual internal call for proposals to 
seek NPS faculty research supporting the interests of our program sponsors. Finally, we 
serve as a “broker” to market specific research topics identified by our sponsors to NPS 
graduate students. This three-pronged approach provides for a rich and broad diversity of 
scholarly rigor mixed with a good blend of practitioner experience in the field of acquisition. 
We are grateful to those of you who have contributed to our research program in the past 
and encourage your future participation. 
Unfortunately, what will be missing this year is the active participation and 
networking that has been the hallmark of previous symposia. By purposely limiting 
attendance to 350 people, we encourage just that. This forum remains unique in its effort to 
bring scholars and practitioners together around acquisition research that is both relevant in 
application and rigorous in method. It provides the opportunity to interact with many top DoD 
acquisition officials and acquisition researchers. We encourage dialogue both in the formal 
panel sessions and in the many opportunities we make available at meals, breaks, and the 
day-ending socials. Many of our researchers use these occasions to establish new teaming 
arrangements for future research work. Despite the fact that we will not be gathered 
together to reap the above-listed benefits, the ARP will endeavor to stimulate this dialogue 
through various means throughout the year as we interact with our researchers and DoD 
officials.  
Affordability remains a major focus in the DoD acquisition world and will no doubt get 
even more attention as the sequestration outcomes unfold. It is a central tenet of the DoD’s 
Better Buying Power initiatives, which continue to evolve as the DoD finds which of them 
work and which do not. This suggests that research with a focus on affordability will be of 
great interest to the DoD leadership in the year to come. Whether you’re a practitioner or 
scholar, we invite you to participate in that research. 
We gratefully acknowledge the ongoing support and leadership of our sponsors, 
whose foresight and vision have assured the continuing success of the ARP:  
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 Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology, & 
Logistics) 
 Director, Acquisition Career Management, ASN (RD&A) 
 Program Executive Officer, SHIPS 
 Commander, Naval Sea Systems Command 
 Program Executive Officer, Integrated Warfare Systems 
 Army Contracting Command, U.S. Army Materiel Command 
 Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force (Acquisition) 
 Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Army (Acquisition, Logistics, & 
Technology) 
 Deputy Director, Acquisition Career Management, U.S. Army 
 Office of Procurement and Assistance Management Headquarters, 
Department of Energy 
 Director, Defense Security Cooperation Agency 
 Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Navy, Research, Development, Test, & 
Evaluation 
 Program Executive Officer, Tactical Aircraft  
 Director, Office of Small Business Programs, Department of the Navy 
 Director, Office of Acquisition Resources and Analysis (ARA) 
 Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Navy, Acquisition & Procurement 
 Director of Open Architecture, DASN (RDT&E) 
 Program Executive Officer, Littoral Combat Ships 
James B. Greene Jr. Keith F. Snider, PhD 
Rear Admiral, U.S. Navy (Ret.) Associate Professor 
  
 ^Åèìáëáíáçå=oÉëÉ~êÅÜ=mêçÖê~ãW=




Software Should-Cost Analysis With Parametric Estimation Tools  
Robert Ferguson 
Software Engineering Institute 
The Use of Inflation Indexes in the Department of Defense 
Stanley A. Horowitz, Alexander O. Gallo, Robert J. Shue, Daniel B. Levine, and 
Robert W. Thomas 
Institute for Defense Analyses 
Political Connections of the Boards of Directors and Defense Contractors’ Excessive 
Profits 
Chong Wang 
Naval Postgraduate School 
An Analytical Synopsis of Dr. Ashton Carter’s “Should-Cost” Initiatives 
Cory Yoder 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Quantifying Uncertainty for Early Life Cycle Cost Estimates 
Jim McCurley, Bob Ferguson, Dennis Goldenson, Robert Stoddard, and David 
Zubrow 
Software Engineering Institute 
 ^Åèìáëáíáçå=oÉëÉ~êÅÜ=mêçÖê~ãW=
`êÉ~íáåÖ=póåÉêÖó=Ñçê=fåÑçêãÉÇ=ÅÜ~åÖÉ= -=441 - 
=
An Analytical Synopsis of Dr. Ashton Carter’s “Should-
Cost” Initiatives 
Cory Yoder—Yoder is a senior lecturer and academic associate for the MSCM Curriculum, Graduate 
School of Business and Public Policy, NPS. Yoder holds a BS in business management from Indiana 
University, an MA in national security and strategic studies from the Naval War College, and an MS in 
management from NPS. A retired naval commander, Yoder is Level III certified in contracting. 
[ecyoder@nps.edu]  
Abstract 
Dr. Ashton Carter, Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics 
(USD [AT&L]), and Robert F. Hale, Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller/Chief Financial 
Officer), issued a Joint memorandum on April 22, 2011, titled Joint Memorandum on Saving 
Related to “Should-Cost.”  As iterated in the memorandum, Dr. Carter’s goal for the should-
cost initiative is to ensure that program managers (PMs) drive productivity improvements into 
their programs during contract negotiations and throughout program execution and 
sustainment.  This is achievable, according to Dr. Carter, if PMs continuously perform should-
cost analysis that scrutinizes every element of government and contractor cost.  
In addition to the Joint memorandum, Dr. Carter issued a second memorandum on April 22, 
2011, for acquisition and logistics professionals, titled Implementation of Will-Cost and 
Should-Cost Management.  This guidance is applicable for all acquisition category (ACAT) I, 
II, and III programs.   
The purpose of this research is to examine the potential impacts this and related directives 
have on the contracting community’s ability to request, acquire, audit, and utilize data 
germane to contract negotiations and management and whether there may be inherent 
potential conflicts with the commercial item acquisition provisions of Federal Acquisition 
Regulation (FAR) Part 12 and the contract pricing initiatives of FAR Part 15 to reduce 
reliance on the Truth in Negotiations Act (TINA) requirements for certified cost and pricing 
data and cost accounting standards (CAS), and explore strategies for implementing the 
directive effectively.  Additionally, the research determines the nature and extent of any 
potential impacts on the Defense Contract Management Agency (DCMA) and Defense 
Contract Audit Agency (DCAA) at supporting the should-cost effort. 
Research Purpose and Objective 
In response to skyrocketing program, acquisition, and contract cost on major 
weapons systems, Dr. Ashton Carter, Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology, 
and Logistics; USD [AT&L]), and Robert F. Hale, Under Secretary of Defense 
(Comptroller/Chief Financial Officer), issued a Joint memorandum on April 22, 2011, titled 
Joint Memorandum on Savings Related to “Should-Cost.”  As iterated in the memorandum, 
Dr. Carter’s goal for the should-cost initiative is to ensure that program managers (PMs) 
drive productivity improvements into their programs during contract negotiations and 
throughout program execution and sustainment.  This is achievable, according to Dr. Carter, 
if PMs continually perform should-cost analysis that scrutinizes every element of 
government and contractor cost.  
In addition to the Joint memorandum, Dr. Carter issued a second memorandum on 
April 22, 2011, for acquisition and logistics professionals, titled Implementation of Will-Cost 
and Should-Cost Management. This guidance is applicable for all acquisition category 
(ACAT) I, II, and III programs.   
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The objective of this research is to examine the potential impacts this and related 
directives have on the contracting community’s ability to request, acquire, audit, and utilize 
data germane to contract negotiations and management and to determine whether there 
may be inherent potential conflicts with commercial item acquisition provisions of FAR Part 
12, and Contract Pricing FAR Part 15 initiatives to reduce reliance on the Truth in 
Negotiations Act (TINA) requirements for certified cost and pricing data and cost accounting 
standards (CAS), and explore strategies for implementing the directive effectively.  
Additionally, the research determines the nature and extent of any potential impacts on the 
Defense Contract Management Agency (DCMA) and Defense Contract Audit Agency 
(DCAA) at supporting the should-cost effort as iterated. 
It is my belief that this work will add value to the current body of work designed to 
create a culture of efficiency and effectiveness in Department of Defense (DoD) 
procurement and contracting and provide a highly referenced and readable work useful for 
policy-makers, practitioners, and academics.  
Research Questions 
The primary research questions addressed in this paper are as follows: 
 What specific impact does Dr. Carter’s should-cost directive have on DoD 
contracting as related to protocols for acquiring commercial items?  
 What are the data requirement provisions under protocols for acquiring 
commercial items versus non-protocols for acquiring commercial items?  
 Is the should-cost requirement approach, as defined in the memorandum, 
achievable under the commercial item acquisition provisions of the Federal 
Acquisition Reform Act (FARA) and the Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act 
(FASA), or does the memorandum call for another acquisition strategy using 
non-protocols for acquiring commercial items? 
 If the should-cost memorandum mandates are to be achieved, what specific 
actions and strategies must be taken by contracting offices to support the 
mandate? 
 Are the DCMA and DCAA able to fully support this initiative, and what specific 
actions must they take?  
 What specific findings and recommendations can be proffered to effectively 
implement the should-cost initiatives?   
Methodology and Scope 
This research includes a thorough literature review, examination and assimilation of 
key policy documents, and outreach to subject-matter experts (SMEs) integral to the should-
cost will-cost initiative. Specific sources include, but are not limited to, the following:  
 Government Accountability Office (GAO) reports and testimony, 
 existing and ongoing research efforts at the Naval Postgraduate School 
(NPS), 
 professional information sources from major systems PM and contracting 
activities, 
 academic literature, and 
 SMEs within the DoD and other organizations.  
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Whenever SMEs are utilized, the DoD and NPS mandate that Institutional Review 
Board (IRB) protocols be followed to ensure SMEs are given full notification of a 
researcher’s intent to use information gathered from them for research purposes. In 
accordance with these policies, I obtained consent from all SMEs that I consulted as part of 
my research for this published work.  
Based on the information obtained through this research, I make conclusions and 
recommendations to professionals desiring a better understanding of the implementation of 
Dr. Carter’s should-cost will-cost initiative, address concerns over potential conflicts with the 
FARA and FASA, and identify how the DoD may be best structured for achieving the 
greatest efficiencies and effectiveness at implementation.  
Should-Cost and Will-Cost Defined 
The definitions of should-cost and will-cost are necessary for an understanding of the 
concepts and their applicability.   
 Will-cost is defined as what a program weapons system is likely to cost given 
a non-advocate (independent) cost estimate, such as in an independent cost 
estimate (ICE) or independent government estimate (IGE), based primarily on 
historical cost incurred.   
 Should-cost is defined as the program weapons system cost adjusted for the 
program’s initiatives or opportunities to reduce cost below the ICE level.  
The main difference between will-cost and should-cost is the extensive use of 
historically incurred cost for will-cost estimates versus the examination of forward-looking 
efforts at reducing cost in operations.  
Better Buying Power: Mandate for Restoring Affordability and Productivity in Defense 
Spending (June 2010) 
On June 28, 2010, Dr. Carter issued the first in a series of memoranda mandating 
affordability and efficiency in DoD spending.  The memorandum for acquisition 
professionals, titled Better Buying Power: Mandate for Restoring Affordability and 
Productivity in Defense Spending (Carter, 2010a), laid the foundation for all subsequent 
memoranda issued over the next 15 months.  In this memorandum, Dr. Carter called for  
delivering better value to the taxpayer and improving the way the Department 
does business. … We must abandon inefficient practices accumulated in a 
period of budget growth and learn to manage defense dollars in a manner 
that is, to quote Secretary Gates at his May 8, 2010 speech at the 
Eisenhower Library, “respectful of the American taxpayer at a time of 
economic and fiscal distress.” (Carter, 2010a) 
Better Buying Power: Guidance for Obtaining Greater Efficiency and Productivity in 
Defense Spending and Implementation Directive for Better Buying Power—Restoring 
Affordability and Productivity in Defense Spending (September 2010) 
Dr. Carter subsequently issued two memoranda, again while acting as USD(AT&L); 
both memoranda were dated and released on September 14, 2010.  The first memorandum 
is titled Better Buying Power: Guidance for Obtaining Greater Efficiency and Productivity in 
Defense Spending (Carter, 2010b) and the second is titled Implementation Directive for 
Better Buying Power—Restoring Affordability and Productivity in Defense Spending (Carter, 
2010c). 
The memorandum Implementation Directive for Better Buying Power—Restoring 
Affordability and Productivity in Defense Spending (Carter, 2010c) requested the Director, 
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Defense Procurement and Acquisition Policy (DPAP) to develop the protocols and 
manpower required to implement the overarching initiatives in the Better Buying Power 
memorandums.  This request included incorporation and integration of key agencies in the 
protocol and manpower reviews, including the DCMA and the DCAA.  An excerpt from this 
memorandum states, 
Work with the Defense Contract Audit Agency (DCAA) and the Defense 
Contract Management Agency (DCMA) to develop guidance, which will 
clearly spell out the roles and responsibilities of each organization in those 
areas where duplication and overlap occur.  Provide recommended guidance 
to me and to the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) by December 1, 
2010.  
By October 1, 2010, you are to task DCMA to be responsible for the 
promulgation of all Forward Pricing Rate Recommendations. In those cases, 
where DCAA has completed an audit of a particular contractor’s rates, DCMA 
shall adopt the DCAA recommended rates as the Department’s position with 
regards to those. (Carter, 2010c)  
Dr. Carter also stated,  
To put it bluntly: we have a continuing responsibility to procure the critical 
goods and services our forces need in the years ahead, but we will not have 
ever-increasing budgets to pay for them. We must therefore strive to achieve 
what economists call productivity growth: in simple terms, to DO MORE 
WITHOUT MORE. (Carter, 2010c) 
Acting on Secretary of Defense Robert Gates’ call for obtaining greater efficiencies in 
DoD procurements, Dr. Carter worked with senior leaders in the acquisition community—
including the component acquisition executives (CAEs), senior logisticians and systems 
command leaders, the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), program executive officers 
(PEOs), and PMs—to create the Better Buying Power initiatives and guidance. The 
guidance potentially affected $400 billion of the $700 billion DoD budget spent on goods and 
services ($200 billion each for weapons, electronics, fuel, etc., and $200 billion for 
information technology [IT] support). Secretary Gates and Dr. Carter estimated the potential 
savings from the initiatives and guidance as a significant element of the targeted $100 billion 
from unproductive to more productive purposes over the five-year period from 2011–2015.   
Within the USD(AT&L) guidance memorandum, the should-cost protocol was 
addressed as a means to reduce unproductive overhead within supporting contractors and 
to capture reductions in contracts by informing future price and contract-type negotiations 
(Carter, 2010b).  The following is an excerpt from Dr. Carter’s September 14, 2010, Better 
Buying Power memorandum:  
During contract negotiation and program execution, our managers should be 
driving productivity improvement in their programs. They should be 
scrutinizing every element of program cost, assessing whether each element 
can be reduced relative to the year before, challenging learning curves, 
dissecting overheads and indirect costs, and targeting cost reduction with 
profit incentive—in short, executing to what the program should cost. The 
Department’s decision makers and Congress use independent cost estimates 
(ICE)—forecasts of what a program will cost based upon reasonable 
extrapolations from historical experience—to support budgeting and 
programming. While ICE Will Cost analysis is valuable and credible, it does 
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not help the program manager to drive leanness into the program. In fact, just 
the opposite can occur: the ICE, reflecting business-as-usual management in 
past programs, becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy. The forecast budget is 
expected, even required, to be fully obligated and expended. 
To interrupt this vicious cycle and give program managers and 
contracting officers and their industry counterparts a tool to drive productivity 
improvement into programs, I will require the manager of each major program 
to conduct a Should Cost analysis justifying each element of program cost 
and showing how it is improving year by year or meeting other relevant 
benchmarks for value. Meanwhile, the Department will continue to set the 
program budget baseline (used also in ADMs and Selected Acquisition 
Reports (SARs)) using an ICE. We will use this method, for example, to drive 
cost down in the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) program, the Department’s largest 
program and the backbone of tactical air power for the U.S. and many other 
countries in the future. This aircraft’s ICE (Will Cost) average unit price grew 
from $50 million Average Unit Procurement Cost (APUC) when the program 
began (in 2002 dollars, when the program was baselined) to $92 million in the 
most recent ICE. Accordingly, the JSF program had a Nunn-McCurdy breach 
last year and had to be restructured by the Secretary of Defense. As a result 
of that restructuring, a Should Cost analysis is being done in association with 
the negotiation of the early lot production contracts. The Department is 
scrubbing costs with the aim of identifying unneeded cost and rewarding its 
elimination over time. The result should be a negotiated price substantially 
lower than the Will Cost ICE to which the Department has forecasted and 
budgeted. Secretary Gates indicated in his Efficiency Initiative that the 
Service that achieved the efficiency could retain monies saved in this way; in 
this case the Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps could reallocate JSF funds 
to buy other capabilities. 
The Department will obligate about $2 trillion in contracts over the next 
five years according to Will Cost estimates, so savings of a few percent per 
year in execution are significant. 
The metric of success for Should Cost management leading to annual 
productivity increases is annual savings of a few percent from all our ongoing 
contracted activities as they execute to a lower figure than budgeted. Industry 
can succeed in this environment because we will tie better performance to 
higher profit, and because affordable programs will not face cancellation. 
(Carter, 2010b, pp. 3–4) 
This excerpt, on close examination, promoted a forward-looking analysis of 
contractors’ embedded practices and associated cost for production as the should-cost 
position on which PMs must focus, rather than on the initial and/or existing will-cost position 
that serves as the initial baseline for the program. 
Implementation Directive for Better Buying Power—Obtaining Greater Efficiency and 
Productivity in Defense Spending (November 2010) 
Dr. Carter’s seven-page November 3, 2010, memorandum, titled Implementation 
Directive for Better Buying Power—Obtaining Greater Efficiency and Productivity in Defense 
Spending, reiterated guidance provided in prior memoranda and specified actions that the 
secretaries of the military departments and directors of defense agencies should execute 
immediately or in the time frame specified within the memorandum.  The memorandum also 
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stated that additional actions in support of the initiatives proffered in the memoranda dated 
September 14, 2010, would be developed over the following weeks and months.  The 
memorandum addressed five specific areas from the September 14, 2010, memoranda: (1) 
targeting affordability and controlling cost growth, (2) incentivizing productivity and 
innovation in industry, (3) promoting real competition, (4) improving tradecraft in service 
acquisition, and (5) reducing non-productive processes and bureaucracy.   
Will-cost and should-cost are specifically addressed in the following excerpt from Dr. 
Carter’s memorandum:  
Effective November 15, 2010, you will establish “Should Cost” targets as 
management tools for all ACAT I programs as they are considered for major 
MS decisions. As described in my September 14, 2010, Guidance to the 
acquisition workforce, “Should Cost” targets will be developed using sound 
estimating techniques that are based on bottom-up assessments of what 
programs should cost, if reasonable efficiency and productivity enhancing 
efforts are undertaken. 
These costs will be used as a basis for contract negotiations and contract 
incentives and to track contractor and program executive officer/project 
manager performance. Program performance against “Should Cost” 
estimates will be reported to the Office of Acquisition Resources and Analysis 
through Acquisition Visibility Service Oriented Architecture (AV SoA). 
By January 1, 2011, you will establish “Should Cost” estimates for ACAT 
II and III programs as they are considered for component MS decisions. You 
will use “Should Cost”-based management to track performance of ACAT II 
and III programs. (Carter, 2010d) 
Dr. Carter further invoked the should-cost initiative in addressing poor tradecraft in 
services acquisitions, stating,  
I will issue further detailed guidance for establishing taxonomy of preferred 
contract types in services acquisition, but starting immediately, you will 
ensure that services acquisitions under your control are predisposed toward 
Cost-Plus-Fixed-Fee (CPFF) or Cost-Plus-Incentive Fee (CPIF) 
arrangements when robust competition or recent competitive pricing history 
does not exist. This practice will be used to build sufficient cost knowledge of 
those services within that market segment. You will employ that cost 
knowledge to inform the “Should Cost” estimates of future price and contract 
type negotiations. When robust competition already exists, or there is recent 
competitive pricing history, you will ensure that services acquisitions under 
your control are predisposed toward Firm-Fixed-Price (FFP) type contract 
arrangements. FFP should also be used to the maximum extent reasonable 
when ongoing competition is used in Multiple Award Contract scenarios. 
(Carter, 2010c) 
In the preceding context, Dr. Carter wanted to build a knowledge base of cost within 
particular service segments where true competition is not driving the prices paid.  This can 
only be accomplished through contract vehicles that allow for detailed submission of cost 
estimates in discussions and negotiations and for utilization of that data to support future 
contract negotiations.  Hence Dr. Carter’s predisposition for cost-plus-fixed-fee (CPFF) and 
cost-plus-incentive-fee (CPIF) contract arrangements in non-competitive circumstances. 
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Programs Initially Covered by Ashton Carter’s Should-Cost Initiative 
The implementation of will-cost and should-cost management initiatives was targeted 
at five ACAT I–III programs equally allocated in the Army, Navy, and Air Force.  The five 
programs (shown in Table 1) vary in their current maturity and milestone attainments. 
 Should-Cost Management Example (Pilot) Programs 
Air Force Army Navy 
Joint Strike Fighter (F-35) Joint Air Ground Missile 
(JAGM) 
Joint Strike Fighter (F-35) 
Global Hawk Blocks 30 & 
40 (GH BLK 30 & 40) 
Black Hawk (UH-60M) Hawkeye (E-2D) 
Space Based Infrared 
System (SBIRS) 
Ground Combat Vehicle 
(GCV) 
Presidential Helo (VXX) 
Evolved Expendable 
Launch Vehicle (EELV) 
Paladin Product 
Improvement (PIM) 
Littoral Combat Ship 
(LCS) 
Advanced Extremely 
High Frequency (AEHF) 
Satellite System 
NETT Warrior Ohio Replacement 
Program 
Note. The information in this table was adapted from Dr. Carter’s Implementation of Will-Cost and 
Should Cost Management memorandum, dated April 22, 2011.  
Should-Cost Will-Cost Implementation Memoranda Summary  
The Services, Navy, Air Force, and Army, have implemented Dr. Carter’s should-cost 
initiative with striking similarities. Table 2 is an examination of the implementation 
memoranda key elements and provisions.    






ASN (RD&A) Memo 




Dept. of the Air 
Force Memo June 
15, 2011  
Army 
Implementation—
Dept. of Army 




Yes  Yes Yes 
Definition & Use of 
Will-Cost 
Yes. Independent 
baseline for program 


















Yes. CAPE ICE or 
service cost position. 
SECNAVINST 
5223.3 DON SCP 
germane. Will-cost is 
the program of 
record estimate and 




with Air Force AFPD 
65-5 and AFI 65-
508 for ACAT I and 
with approval from 
product or logistics 
center financial cost 
estimating 
Yes. ICE existing 
ACAT I and 
managed ACAT II 
defined protocols 
extend to ACAT III 
programs. Will-cost 
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description (CARD).  organization (FMC). programming, and 
reporting.  
Definition & Use of 
Should-Cost 






learned, and best 
practices in 
productivity and for 
informed 
negotiations under 
FAR 15.407-4 and 





Yes. PM develops 
targets via driving 
leanness at major 
milestone decisions. 




the department.  





to performance.  
NOT for budgeting, 
programming, or 
reporting outside 
the department.  
Creates informed 
negotiations under 
FAR 15.407-4 and 





PM responsible for 
targets.  
Developed in one or 
more of three ways: 





all programs with a 
will-cost estimate.  
2) bottom-up 
estimate without a 
formal FAR/DFARS 
should-cost review.  
3) bottom-up 
estimate with a 
formal FAR/DFARS 
should-cost review. 
PM responsible for 
targets along with 
tracking and 
reporting. AT&L 
(ACAT 1D and 





milestones.   
 
PM responsible for 
identifying savings 
opportunities and 
targets.  Not 
applicable to quick 







schedule.  MDA 
approves should-
cost targets.  
Recommended 
approaches:  



















PM with assistance 
from outside 
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Development from the Naval 
Center for Cost 
Analysis (NCAA), 
DCMA, and other 
PM offices.  
Can seek 
assistance from 
outside: the AFCAA 
or DCMA. 
organizations such 
as Deputy Assistant 
Secretary for the 
Army Cost and 
Economics (DASA 
[CE]) and DCMA. 
Milestone A Will-cost estimate 
(initial or updated) 
should-cost 
management target 
(initial or update)  
Will-cost estimate 
(initial or updated) 
should-cost 
management target 
(initial or update) 
Will-cost estimate 
(initial or updated) 
should-cost 
management target 
(initial or update) 
Milestone B Will-cost update 





execution baseline)  









execution baseline)  









execution baseline)  
Initial to support 
contract actions 
(optional) 
Milestone C Update will-cost and 
should-cost. 
Indirect/direct 
contract cost reviews 
(optional) 
FAR 15.407-4 and 
DFARS 215.407-4 





FAR 15.407-4 and 
DFARS 215.407-4 














Yes, delta withheld.  
SAE for ACAT I, 
MDA for ACAT II, 
PEO for ACAT III 
Yes, delta withheld. 






Yes, delta managed 
consistent with the 
type of contracts 
used in the 
program. When 
fixed-price contracts 
are utilized, any 
delta should be 
considered 
“realized” and built 
into the contract.  
Reporting 
Templates 
Yes Yes Yes 
Analysis of the Potential Impacts of Ashton Carter’s “Should-Cost” Memorandum on 
Defense Contracting—Findings and Recommendations 
The following summarizes key findings and recommendations presented in NPS-CM-
12-199 (Yoder, 2012):   
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 Finding & Recommendation #1: FARA and FASA 
There is a conflict in the specific definition of commercial item acquisition that 
allows for major weapons systems procurements in limited- or non-
competitive marketplaces to be characterized as commercial under FARA 
and FASA statutes.  Current legislative proposals are under congressional 
review to revise the statutory definition.  
 Finding & Recommendation #2: Personnel 
The DCMA, the DCAA, and the Services have made, and are re-capitalizing 
their workforce with credentialed personnel in key functional specialties 
needed to support the should-cost initiative.  Key functional specialties 
include, but are not limited to, auditors and production specialists, with 
additional specialties in Lean Six Sigma, process management, and so forth. 
The personnel increases must be protected against any potential cuts to 
ensure that cost consciousness and reduction in systems acquisition cost can 
mature and flourish—continue to re-capitalize the workforce.   
 Finding & Recommendation #3: Platforms  
The CBAR data system has recently been deployed by DCMA. This platform 
was established in March 2011, providing necessary single-point access to 
key information spanning DoD-wide contracts and relevant information 
required for contracting officers to produce pre-negotiation business 
clearances, sometimes known as business clearance memoranda (BCM), as 
a pre-cursor to conducting negotiations pursuant to a contract award, and 
data for the continued management of contracts with real-time actionable 
information available 24/7 via a secure network.  Although the DCMA and 
DCAA will drive much of the data input, all DoD services and systems 
commands will have it, and have key roles in populating and managing data 
in the system. The CBAR system must be funded to maintain accurate and 
recent data.  The data must be relevant and germane to the should-cost 
effort, which will take quality personnel to define, collect, and populate the 
data.  Continued management and maintenance of this system is imperative 
and must have high-level support.   
 Finding #4: Protocols  
Notwithstanding the FARA and FASA findings and recommendations 
mentioned previously, the protocols for should-cost analysis have been 
promulgated with an emphasis on flexibility.  This flexibility allows program 
offices the highest degree of latitude in determining should-cost targets and 
how to achieve those targets.  That information must be shared within the 
government for future target savings and contract negotiations.  Continue to 
emphasize Service program office entrepreneurship at developing individual 
targets.  Share information, internally, with other program and contracting 
offices via the CBAR.   
 Finding & Recommendation #5: Should-Cost Target Savings Holdback 
There is concern that if not managed properly, holdback funds may be re-
allocated for purposes other than improvements in immediate weapons 
systems acquisition, thus creating a huge disincentive for program offices to 
set aggressive should-cost targets. Senior leaders must provide incentives for 
the program offices to set aggressive should-cost targets, wherein the will-
cost versus should-cost potential savings have a guaranteed amount or 
percentage; I’ll call it a cost savings incentive (CSI) that can be used for 
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program purposes and objectives.  The program office can utilize the CSI 
amount, which perhaps represents either the entire delta or a portion of it.  
 Finding & Recommendation #6: Metrics and Determining Success 
Meaningful metrics to determine the efficacy of the should-cost initiative are 
needed by Milestone authorities, PMs and PCOs, although these metrics 
have yet to be developed and universally promulgated. Sound metrics for 
cost reductions, efficiency gains and such, must be developed and 
implemented to determine the efficacy of the should-cost initiative.  At a 
minimum, an ROI can be developed and utilized, capturing the DoD’s total 
loaded labor cost to conduct the should-cost efforts, including organic and 
contractor personnel dedicated to the efforts, against actual target savings 
achieved.   
Final Thoughts and Further Reading 
An Analysis of the Potential Impacts of Ashton Carter’s “Should-Cost” Memorandum 
on Defense Contracting (NPS-CM-12-199; Yoder, 2012), dated September 17, 2012, is 
much more comprehensive in its presentation of this topic.  The original work, NPS-CM-12-
199, contains 77 pages of presentation and analysis, along with an additional 95 pages of 
supporting appendices, for a total of nearly 175 pages—far more detailed than the 
information it is possible to present in this synoptic examination.    
Those interested in this topic, and those who would like additional details, are 
encouraged to access NPS-CM-12-199 at the Naval Postgraduate School, Acquisition 
Research Program website (www.acquisitionresearch.org).  
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